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The  economic  organization  of  American  agriculture  is  in  the
process  of  radical  transition.  The  science-based  industrialization  of
the  economy  is  creating  a  need,  and  a demand,  for revised  rules  of
the game for coordinating economic  activity and distributing  rewards.
Among  the  changes  in  rules  regulating  the economic  organization  of
agriculture  which  are  up  for  serious  consideration  are  those  which
would  facilitate  collective  bargaining  by farmers.  The purpose  of this
paper  is  to enter  into  the discussion  of the  implications  of changes in
the  rules  for collective bargaining  by farmers,  especially  as  related to
possible  effects on the structure  of agriculture,  distribution  of income,
economic  efficiency,  and market  performance.
SOME  LEGAL  BACKGROUND  TO  COLLECTIVE  BARGAINING
In  principle  it  is  the  stated  policy  of  the  U.S.  Government  to
foster  competition  and restrict concentration  of economic  power. The
Sherman  Act  of  1890  established  formal  rules  for  competition  by
making  conspiracies  to  restrain  competition  illegal  and  by  imposing
restrictions on  attempts by firms to monopolize  markets. The Clayton
Act  of  1914  added prohibitions  relating  to  price  discrimination,  ty-
ing clauses  and exclusive  dealing arrangements,  certain  types of merg-
ers  and  interlocking  directories,  which  might  lessen  competition  or
tend  toward  monopoly.  In  the  same  year  the  Federal  Trade  Com-
mission  Act  was  adopted,  primarily  to provide  assistance  in enforce-
ment  of  the  Clayton  and  Sherman  Acts,  but  it  also  attempted  to
regulate  a number  of practices  considered  inconsistent  with fair com-
petition.  The  Robinson-Patman  Act  of  1936  further  specified  un-
lawful  conduct  where  the  effect  may  be  to  lessen  competition  or to
tend  to  create  monopoly.  And  the  Celler-Kefauver  amendment  in
1950  attempted  to  curb  mergers  by  making  the  acquisition  of assets
of  competitors  subject  to antitrust  action.  The  rules  of the  game,  of
course,  consist of  much more  than statutes.  The  "de facto"  rules  de-
pend upon enforcement  by  administrative  agencies  and interpretation
by  the  courts.
In  the  late  1800's  and  early  1900's  the  courts  applied  the prin-
ciples  of  the  Sherman  Act  to  labor  as  well  as  to  business.  Unions
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usually  resulted  in  a court  injunction bringing  the force  of  the  com-
munity  against  the  union.  Strikes  and  boycotts  were  considered  to
restrain  trade.  An  apparent  attempt  to  exempt  labor  and  farmers
from  the  provisions  of  the  Sherman Act  was  included  in  the Clayton
Act. It  declared  that:
Nothing  contained  in the  antitrust  laws shall  be construed to  forbid
the  existence  and  operation  of  labor,  agricultural,  or horticultural  or-
ganization,  instituted  for the  purpose  of  mutual  help  . . . or  to  forbid
or  restrain  members  of  such  organizations  from  lawfully  carrying  out
legitimate  objectives  thereof;  nor  shall  such  organization  . . . be  held
or  construed  to  be  illegal  combinations  or  conspiracies  in  restraint
of trade,  under  the  antitrust  laws.
However,  court  interpretation,  while  mixed,  tended  to  support
the position that  the  Clayton Act  did not exempt  labor organizations
from  accountability  when  they  engaged  in  actual  combination  or  re-
straint  of trade.
The Norris-LaGuardia  (Anti-Injunction)  Act  of  1932  expanded
the  rights  of  labor  to  engage  in  united  efforts  by limiting  the injunc-
tive  power  of  the  courts.  This  left  the  government  about  neutral
in  collective  bargaining  disputes  between  unions  and  management.
Unions  could  organize  and  exert  direct  pressure  on  management,
and  management  could  engage  in  a  variety  of  tactics  to  discourage
union  membership.  By  1935  the  Congress  decided  orderly  proce-
dures for  collective bargaining  should be  established,  and  passed  the
Wagner  (National  Labor  Relations)  Act.  This  act  set  up  the  Na-
tional  Labor  Relations  Board,  outlined  procedures  for  recognition,
and  established  a  set  of  ground  rules  for  collective  bargaining.  The
encouragement  of  collective  bargaining  became  public  policy.  The
Wagner  Act  was  significantly  modified  by  the  Taft-Hartley  (Labor-
Management  Relations)  Act  which  stands  as  the  basic  framework
of  rules  for collective  bargaining  between  labor  and  management.
Farmers  are  treated  uniquely  under  our  rules  of  competition.
They  are not treated  as  other  employers  in  that  agricultural  laborers
are  not covered  by  the  Labor-Management  Relations  Act.
The  Capper-Volstead  Act  of  1922  and  the  Cooperative  Market-
ing  Act  of  1926  exempt  farmers  from  most  provisions  of  the  anti-
trust  laws  and  encourage  agricultural  cooperatives.  The  extent  to
which  cooperatives  are  immune  from  antitrust  is  unclear.  The  courts
have  held  some  actions  of  cooperatives  as  antitrust  violations.  The
law  seems  to  be that  farmers  may  unite  in  a  cooperative,  but  once
formed,  the  cooperative  as  an  entity  is  subject  to  the  same  rules
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empowers  the  Secretary  of  Agriculture  to  order  a  cooperative  to
cease  and  desist  if  it  is  successful  in  unduly  enhancing prices  of  its
products.  The  Capper-Volstead  Act  permits  formation  of  coopera-
tives  for bargaining but provides  no mechanism  for  their recognition,
nor  does  it  establish  rules  for  fair bargaining.
The  Agricultural  Marketing  Agreement  Act  of  1937  provided
for  marketing  agreements  and  orders  for  a  limited  number  of  farm
commodities,  primarily  fruits  and  vegetables  sold  for  fresh  use  and
milk.  The orders  provide  another  mechanism  for collective  action  by
eligible farmers  under the  supervision of the  Secretary of Agriculture.
Limited  supply  management  and  price  discrimination  are  possible
under  this  law.  However,  the  lack  of  control  of  entry  or  control of
farmer  production  has  limited  the  capacity  to  achieve  monopoly  re-
turns  under the  orders.
A  host  of  federal  price  and  production  control  programs  also
modify  competition  in  farming.
ORGANIZATIONAL  COSTS  AND  PROBLEMS
Before  discussing  some  of  the  potential  gains  and  consequences
of  collective  bargaining,  let  me  simply  mention  that  organizational
costs  and problems  exist.  Collective  bargaining cannot  be  done  with-
out  cost.  Recruitment  is  expensive.  And  recruitment  of  a  sufficient
number  of  farmers  to  effectively  manage  supplies  and  thereby  gain
a monopoly  price for many  commodities  is  probably impossible  with-
out additional  facilitating  legislation.
A  particular  difficulty  is  the  free  rider  problem.  If  a  bargaining
association  is  successful  in  achieving  a  price  increase  and  does  not
control  the  full  supply  or  access  to  the  market,  then  nonmembers,
who have not shared in the associated  costs,  benefit more  than mem-
bers.  This situation  makes recruiting  new members  more  difficult and
expensive  and  tends  to  erode  existing  membership.
For  the  farmer,  another  cost  is  the  freedom  of  choice  he  gives
up  by  joining  an  association  and  delegating  some  of  his  manage-
ment  decisions.
I  raise  the  issue  of  organizational  costs  and  problems  because
they  cannot  be  ignored.  A  consideration  of  organizational  problems
emphasizes  that  the  policy  issue  must be  in  terms  of the  rules  facil-
itating  and  regulating  collective bargaining.  Let  us  look  at  a  specific
proposal.
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I would  like  to  concentrate  on  Title  I  of  S. 2973  introduced  by
Senator Mondale,  to  be known  as  the  National Agricultural  Bargain-
ing  Act,  if  passed.
The  Mondale  bill  has  three  titles.  Title  III  makes illegal  a  set of
practices  which  might  be  used  by  handlers  to  discourage  collective
bargaining  activity by farmers.  It is  very  similar to the original  S. 109
recently  passed  in  a  revised  form.  Title  II  greatly  expands  the  po-
tential  for  marketing  orders.  All  farm  produced  commodities  would
be  eligible  for  a  marketing  order.  The  marketing  order  committees
would  have  expanded  powers  for  supply management  and  collective
bargaining.  A  provision  is  included  which  seems  to  say  that handlers
of 50 percent  of the  volume  of a  commodity  must  agree  to  the order
to make  it effective  or that the Secretary of Agriculture plays  a major
role in the  supply management.  Senator  Mondale  sees  this as  an alter-
native  to  Title  I  of the  bill.
Title  I  points  out  that  farmers  do  not  have  the  opportunity  to
organize  and  bargain effectively  for  a just  and reasonable  return  and
are  in  this  respect  disadvantaged  compared  with  industrial  workers
and  those  in  many  other  enterprises  and  employment.  It includes  the
following  provisions  for  overcoming  this  disadvantage:
A National  Agricultural  Relations  Board is  established  to provide
the  administrative  and  technical  support  needed  for  identifying  bar-
gaining  committees  and  facilitating  effective  bargaining.  The frame-
work  is  provided  for growers  of a  particular  commodity or  commod-
ities  to elect  a marketing  committee  or to accept  or reject establishing
a  marketing  committee.  Election  is  by  a  majority  vote  of  farmers,
and  only farmers  are eligible for committee membership.  If producers
elect  to  have  a  marketing  committee,  a committee  to  represent  pros-
pective  purchasers  is  to  be  established.  The  bill  specifies  that  the
marketing  committee  and  the  purchasers  committee  shall  bargain  in
good  faith  to  negotiate  minimum  prices  and nonprice  terms  of  sale.
The  Board  is  to  offer  information  and  also  conciliation  and  media-
tion  services  to the bargaining  committees,  if needed.
If agreement  cannot be reached  between the  two bargaining  com-
mittees,  or  if  the  purchasers  refuse  to  negotiate  the  issues,  the  issues
are  subject to  binding  arbitration.  The  decisions  from  arbitration  are
subject  to judicial  review  in federal  district  court.
The  marketing  committees  are  to  recommend  to  the  Board  the
injunctive  or  other  related  actions  to  be  instituted  to  prevent  buying
and  selling  at  terms  other  than  established  by negotiation  and  to  es-
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jority  vote  of the  producers.
Activities  under  this  act  are  specifically  exempted  from  any  anti-
trust law  of the  United  States.
If total supplies  of a commodity  substantially  exceed  effective  de-
mand  at prices  established  under the  procedures  of the bill,  the mar-
keting  committee  is  to  develop  a plan of marketing  allotments,  with
or without  acreage  or production  limitations,  to  be submitted  to pro-
ducers  for  approval  or rejection.  If  accepted,  the Secretary  of Agri-
culture  is to put  the  plan into  effect,  including the  establishment  and
enforcement  of  necessary  and  reasonable  regulations.
STRUCTURE  AND  ROLE  OF  MARKET
American public policy concerning  competition  has been  ambiva-
lent. It has been public policy to maintain  a fair competitive  game,  as
expressed  in the antitrust laws.  However,  the rules of fair competition
were  never  intended,  as  far  as  I can  tell,  to  create  a purely  competi-
tive  market.  Policy has,  in  fact,  fostered  major  deviations  from pure
competition.
Kenneth  Galbraith,  in  The New  Industrial State, paints  a  broad
brush  description  of  that part  of the  American  economy  dominated
by  the  large corporation.  He argues  that modern  technology  requires
large-scale  organization  and  that  large  bureaucratic  organizations
have  advantages  in  planning  and  financing  and  in  research  and  de-
velopment.  The  large  corporation  has  a need  and capacity  to protect
itself  from  the  risks  and  uncertainties  of  a  purely  competitive  mar-
ket.  It  does  this  through  contractual  and  bargained  arrangements
with  suppliers,  manipulation  of demand,  and with help from  the  gov-
ernment.
It  is  not  only  the existence  of  large  corporations  which  sets  the
American  economy apart from  the structure  of atomistic competition.
Labor  is  highly  organized  and  negotiates  wage  rates.  Many  public
employees  are  organized  and  negotiate  salaries.  Lawyers  and  med-
ical  doctors  have established  fee  schedules.  Barbers  and gasoline deal-
ers  have  associations  and  seem  to  have  agreed  upon  price  schedules.
The  independent  grocers  belong to  what  amount  to  buying coopera-
tives.  Almost  everyone  in  the  economy  is  in  some  way  associated
with  others  in  an  effort  to modify  the  outcome  of  the  market.  This
led  Harold  Breimyer,  in  his  presidential  address  to  the  American
Agricultural  Economics  Association  in  August  1968,  to  call  the
United  States  an  associationistic  economy.
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sede  the  market  as  a  mechanism  for  establishing  price  and  other
terms of exchange between farmers  and first purchasers.  The structure
of  the  market  for  a  particular  transaction  is  a  buying  and  a  selling
cartel.  The  committees  or  cartels  must  consider  the  diverse  interest
of  their members  in  the negotiation  process.  In this  respect  the  struc-
ture  differs  from  bilateral  monopoly.  The  range  in  terms  of  trade
would  be  set  by  negotiation  with  the  exact  terms  within  the  range
set  by the  independent  arbitrator.  The  exact  outcome  is  theoretically
indeterminate.
It  is  impossible  to  generalize  about  the  effect  of  collective  bar-
gaining  on the  structure  of  agriculture,  aside from  the  exchange  rela-
tionship.  Some  type  of supply  management  will  be required  to obtain
substantial  price  advantages  for farmers.  If elasticities  of demand  are
significantly  different  between  alternative  markets,  price  discrimina-
tion  could  be  used  profitably  without  marketing  quotas,  at  least  in
the short run.  This would have some effect on the structure  of process-
ing  and  distribution,  especially  if  rules  had  to  be  imposed  to  keep
the  product  from  moving  from  the  high-price  to  the  low-price  mar-
ket. Whenever supply controls  are used to gain bargaining  advantages,
then  the  rules  allocating  access  to  the  market  have  a  critical  effect
on farm size and ownership  patterns. For example,  in Title I the quota
program  must  be  approved  by  a  majority  vote  of  all  producers.  For
some  commodities  small  producers  would  probably  control  the  pro-
gram  and limit  the  quota  going  to  any  one  producer,  thus  protecting
the  small  farm.  However,  if  the  quota  could  be  sold,  larger  farms
would  be  stimulated.  And,  unless  prohibited,  higher  prices  would
stimulate  vertical  integration.  Thus  we  can  only  conclude  that  col-
lective  bargaining  will  influence  the  structure  and  control  of  farming
but that the  effect  will  depend  upon the  rules  regulating  the  process.
Thus  the  procedural  rules  become  a  major  issue  of public  policy.
SOURCES  OF  BARGAINING  GAINS
There  are  four  classes  of  potential  price  gains  for  farmers  from
effective  collective  bargaining.
1.  Farmers  can  bargain  for  part  of  any  excess  profits  of  the
processing  and  distribution  firms.  However,  the  prospects  are  not
great.  The  studies  of  the  National  Commission  on  Food Marketing
found  little  evidence  of excess  profits.  Most food  processors  and  dis-
tributors  seem  to  be  operating  at  a  rate  of  return  somewhat  below
the  rate  earned  by  all  manufacturing  firms.  At  a North  Central  re-
gional  marketing  seminar  held  in  April  1968, John  Moore  estimated
that  bargaining  which  would  have  left food  processors  a  10  percent
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in  1966)  would  have  resulted  in  the  following  changes  in  prices  re-
ceived by farmers:
Percent





Fluid  milk  1.2
Wheat  for  bread  3.6
Only  in  the  case  of a  very few  selected  commodities  would  the  gains
extracted  from  excess  profits  be  expected  to  exceed  the  cost  of  col-
lective  bargaining.
2.  Farmers  could  attempt  to bargain  to  capture potential  savings
from lower  cost operation  in processing  and distribution.  The absence
of excess  profits  is  not  conclusive  evidence  that prices  paid  to  farm-
ers  could  not  be  increased  without  higher  retail  prices.  The  buying
firms may have organization  slack. For example,  they may have more
employees  than  necessary  or  be  paying higher  wages  or salaries  than
necessary.  The  industry  may be  engaged  in  practices  which  are  com-
petitively  wasteful.  For  example,  they  may  have  duplicate  assembly
and delivery routes  or may be engaged in promotional activities which
"cancel  out" for the  industry  as  a whole.  And firms may be operating
considerably  below  optimum  scale.  We  have  many  studies  indicating
that  costs  could be  reduced  in processing  a number  of farm  products
by  operating  fewer  and  larger plants  properly  located.  It  is  conceiv-
able  that  collective  bargaining  could  force  some  consolidation  and
could  provide  discipline  to  an  industry  which cannot  itself  eliminate
competitively  wasteful  practices.
No accurate  estimate  of  the magnitude  of  potential  savings  from
these  sources  is  available.  My  own  estimate  is  that  they  amount  to
much  more than  excess  profits.
3.  The  bargaining  association  may  be  able  to  offer  savings  or
other  advantages  to  the  buying  firms.  As  the  food  sector  becomes
more  industrialized,  the  value  of  improved  coordinating  services  in-
creases.  The  modern  corporation  desires  to  reduce  risk  and  uncer-
tainty.  It  often  invests  large  sums  in  promotion.  Plants  operate  with
high fixed costs.  As a result  supplies meeting quality and timing speci-
fications  are valuable  to  the buying  firm.
A bargaining  relationship  may  also improve  coordination  by im-
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could  be  in  terms  of  schedules  of  prices  related  to  quantities  mar-
keted from fixed contracted  acreages.  Since farming continues to suffer
from  errors  in  price  expectations,  a  mechanism  for  forward  pricing
offers  some  important  potential  gains  to  all  participants.
Bargaining  associations  may  be  able  to  offer  these  and  other
services.  Labor  unions  offer  the  service  of  disciplining  members  and
handling  grievances.  Bargaining  associations  may  be  able  to do  the
same.  In  addition,  the  association  may  improve  coordination  of  the
system  by  improving  information,  production  decisions,  and  distri-
bution  of  products  among  buyers.  These  kinds  of  benefits  are  em-
phasized  by  the Farm  Bureau's  American  Marketing  Association.
4.  The  largest  potential  source  of gain from  bargaining  is  higher
prices  passed  on  to  consumers.  Substantial  gains  from  bargaining
depend  upon  the capacity  of the  bargaining  opponent  to  pass on  the
higher  costs  and  the  capacity  of  the  bargaining  association  to  man-
age  supplies.  Monopoly  profits can  be created  by restricting  and  allo-
cating  supplies.  The  extent  of  the  monopoly  price  gains  will  depend
upon  the  demand  function.  If  close  substitutes  are  available  or  can
be  developed,  this  limits  the  potential  monopoly  profits.
Where  the  buyers  can  pass  on  the  costs  of  higher  bargained
prices,  their  level  of  pain  is  substantially  less  and  their  resolve  in
bargaining  is  affected.  If  the  bargaining  committee  can  assure  all
buyers  that  no  competitor  will  receive  a  lower  price,  the  resistance
to  bargaining  is  greatly  reduced.  Collective  bargaining  may,  in  fact,
be  used  to  increase  farm  prices  and  processors'  profits  at  the  same
time,  increasing  the  total  return  by  limiting  supplies  of  commodities
with  inelastic demand.  In this case  the theoretical  protection  of coun-
tervailing  power  of buyer  and seller bargaining  breaks  down.  In fact,
the  bargaining  committee  and  the  buyers  group  may  collude  to  ex-
ploit  the  consumer.  Under  the  present  competitive  structure,  food
processors  are generally  unable  to  extract  monopoly  profits.  The bar-
gaining  committee  may  provide  the  mechanism  for  achieving  mo-
nopoly  gains.  Title  I of the  Mondale  bill  certainly  sets  up  this  possi-
bility.
DISTRIBUTION  OF  INCOME
I have  argued that  collective bargaining,  given the  rules necessary
to  manage  supplies,  has the  potential  to  significantly  increase  prices
paid to  farmers.  But this  tells  us  little of the  effect  collective  bargain-
ing may have  on the  level  and distribution  of income  to farmers.
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siderably  from  commodity  to commodity  due  to  differences  in  indus-
try structure,  supply and demand conditions,  and attitudes of potential
participants.
We  have  little  evidence  of  the  effect  of  unionization  on  total
wages.  Since  gains  depend  largely  on  the  ability  to  restrict  entry,
union  members  would  be  expected  to  gain  at  the  expense  of  some
nonmembers  denied  entry  to  jobs.  In  industries  such  as  clothing,
where  entry  has  been  difficult  to  control,  unionization  seems  to  have
had  little  effect  on  relative  wages.  In coal  mining,  on the  other hand,
wages  of  employed  miners  have  been enhanced  by unionization,  but
restricted  entry  has  cost  unemployed  miners  dearly.
Higher  wages  won  by bargaining  translates  directly  to  higher  in-
come  for  the  union  wage  earner.  The  relationship  is  not  so  direct  in
the  case  of  higher  prices.  For example,  if  the bargaining  committee
negotiates  higher  prices  through  a  price  discrimination  plan,  without
restrictions  on  total  supplies,  the  price  in  the  more  inelastic  market
can  be  maintained  at  a high  level.  But  supplies  will  be  attracted  by
a  higher  blend  price,  lowering  the  price  in  the  more  elastic  market
and eroding  the  monopoly  profits.  Nevertheless,  considerable  income
advantage  may  be  gained  in the process.
Where  the  total  quantities  marketed  are  restricted,  the  effect  on
income distribution  will  depend  on  the  rules  regulating  access  to  the
market.  For  example,  if  free  entry  is  allowed,  but  total  marketings
are  restricted,  the  size  of  the  average  quota  will  be reduced  and  the
small  farmer  will  probably  benefit  relatively  more  than  the  large
farmer.  In fact,  a very large,  low  cost producer,  with few  alternatives,
could  suffer  a  net loss  from  "successful"  bargaining  with  such rules.
If quotas  are  set  on the  basis  of historical experience  and can  be
sold,  the anticipated monoply  profits will be capitalized  into  the value
of the  quota  and  the  benefits  will  go  to those  with  large  commercial
sales.  If  the  quotas  are  not  marketable,  the  anticipated  return  will
tend  to  be  capitalized  into  the  restricted  factors  of  production.  The
factor  most  likely  to  appreciate  in  value  is  land,  and  the factor least
likely  to  appreciate  is  labor.
To  those  of  you  used  to  working  with  price-support  policy,  this
must sound  very  familiar.
As  with  the  price-support  program,  monopoly  profits  from  col-
lective  bargaining  will  not  solve  the  low-income  problem  in  agricul-
ture.  Those who  own  little or  produce  little  will  receive little  benefit.
Benefits  will probably  go  to  the  greedy,  not  the  needy.
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Does  collective  bargaining  by  farmers  reduce  the  efficiency  of
resource  allocation?  A  few  years  ago  many  economists  would  have
argued that  since  collective  bargaining  is  a  deviation  from  the  struc-
tural  conditions  of  the  perfectly  competitive  model,  it  would  con-
tribute  to  less  efficient  use  of  resources.  The  competitive  model  was
accepted  as  a norm,  and it was assumed  that a change in policy which
would  create  a  structure  more  like  the  model  would  tend  to  improve
use  of  resources.  However,  this  is  an  unacceptable  position  for  sev-
eral  reasons.  Let  me  mention  only  one  of  them-the  Lipsey-Land-
caster theorem  of second  best.  The  theorem  states  that in  a concrete
situation  characterized  by  any  deviation  from  the  conditions  of  per-
fect  optimality,  partial  policy  measures  which  eliminate  only  some
of  the  departures  from  the  optimal  arrangement  may  well  result  in
a net  decrease  in  social  welfare.
Given  the  structure  of  the  rest  of  the  economy,  which  is  char-
acterized  by  large-scale  firms  and  associationism,  there  is  no  theo-
retical  basis  for  arguing  that  prohibiting  collective  bargaining  by
farmers would  necessarily  result  in a  better allocation of the resources
of the  economy.
PERFORMANCE
In  my  opinion  discussions  of public  policy  dealing with economic
organization  should  be  centered  on  the  relationship  between  alterna-
tive  sets  of  rules  and  performance.  By  performance  I mean  the  total
flow  of  consequences  from  economic  activity  which  affect  the  well-
being  of the  participants.  Performance  clearly  has  many  dimensions.
And  judgments  have  to  be  made  on  a variety  of  desirable  and  un-
desirable  outcomes  associated  with  any  organization  of economic  ac-
tivity.  The  concept  of  a  simple  optimum  or  ideal  state  has  little
relevance.
At the  same  time  it is  clearly  beyond  our capacity  to  predict  the
full  flow  of  consequences  from  alternative  ways  of  instituting  the
economy.  We  must  select  and  concentrate  on  a  few  measures  of
performance  which  appear  to  be  particularly  relevant.  Without  at-
tempting  to  be  comprehensive,  let me  comment  on the  possible rela-
tionship  of  collective  bargaining  to  some  of the  values  and  goals  of
our  society.  In  the  case  of  each  goal  the  appropriate  question  is:
Given  the  goal,  is  there  a  better way  of  achieving  it?
I believe  our  society puts  a high value  on a fair game.  Given  the
present  structure  of  the  economy,  rules  which  would  give  farmers
some  additional  capacity  to  organize  for collective  bargaining  would,
118in  my  opinion,  make  it  a  somewhat  fairer  competitive  game.  How-
ever,  the fairness  of the  game  will depend  upon the specific  rules  and
practices  in  bargaining.
Related  to  a fair  game  is  the  issue of  concentration  of economic
power.  Clearly  it is  necessary  to  concentrate  the  control  of economic
capacity  to  achieve  economies  of  scale  in  production  and  distribu-
tion.  But,  since  political  power  and  economic  power  are  related,
judgment  on desirable  levels of concentration  must be based  on more
than  production  costs.  Rules  for  collective  bargaining  can  result  in
undesirable  levels  of concentration  of power.  A  private  organization
controlling  the  supply of food  would have  too much power.  If indus-
trialization  continues  in  egg  production  and  fifteen  firms  come  to
control  90  percent  of  egg  production,  a  set  of  rules  allowing  these
firms  to  create  a  cartel  would  probably  be  too  much  concentration
of power.  On the other  hand,  collective  bargaining  limited to  a single
commodity  would  be  subject  to  discipline  from  the  threat  of substi-
tute  products,  including  new  food  analogs,  imports,  and  vertical  in-
tegration.  The  rules,  however,  must be  structured  to  insure  that such
discipline  is  not  removed.
Our society  values  innovation  and  progress.  However,  the  source
of  many  of  the problems  in  agriculture  is  an  inability  to  adjust  to
rapid  technological  change.  Collective  bargaining  could  be  used  to
restrict  innovation  as  the  labor  unions  have  in  some  industries.  And
collective  bargaining,  if  used to protect  high  cost producers  and limit
the  entrance  of new producers,  would inhibit  progress.  On the  other
hand,  the  bargaining  rules  and  organization  could  be  used  to  foster
a progressive  system.  No firm  conclusion  can be reached.
Our  society  desires  low  levels  of  unemployment.  Again  depend-
ing on the  rules  and practice,  collective  bargaining  could either  limit
or  expand  employment  opportunities  in  farming.
As  I  talk  to  farmers  many  indicate  that  they  want  more  from
collective  bargaining  than  better  incomes.  They  want  to  feel  they
have  some  say  in their own  destiny.  They want protection  from  what
they  consider  impersonal  and  arbitrary  conditions  over  which  they
have  no control. They want to participate.  Collective  bargaining  asso-
ciations  may  meet  this  need,  and  the  need seems  to  be  an important
one  in  our  associationistic  society.  If farm  income  support  programs
are  desired, there  is much to be  said for  a program  like Title I which
puts basic  decisions  in  the  hands of participants  and extracts  it from
the  vagaries  of  the  political  process  in  the  Congress,  provided,  of
course,  that sufficient  safeguards  for  the public  interest  are  built into
the  act.
119Our  society  desires  an  abundant  supply  of  high  quality  whole-
some  food  at  a  low  cost.  Again,  depending  upon  the  specific  rules
and  practices,  collective  bargaining  can  facilitate  or  obstruct  attain-
ment  of this  goal.
A  major function of the  economic  system  is,  of course,  to coordi-
nate  economic  activity.  By  coordination  I  mean  the  system  of  in-
formation  and control which  directs  resources  to  uses most consistent
with  the  preferences  of  consumers.  In  our  industrialized  society  we
have  major  problems  in  vertical  coordination  because  of  the  com-
plex  operations  in  production  and  distribution.  Price  instability  and
price  cycles  are  symptoms  of coordination  problems.  Collective  bar-
gaining  can  be  used  to  improve  vertical  coordination.  The  question
is  whether  it  is  the  best  means  for  this  purpose.  A  private  forward
pricing  system  based  upon  deliverable  future  contracts  might  be  de-
veloped  to  do  the job  more  effectively  than  through bargaining  asso-
ciations.  At  any  rate  there  is  no  evidence  that  a return  to  atomistic
competition  would  provide  better coordination  than  a system  of col-
lective  bargaining.  And  collective  bargaining  could  be  instituted  to
provide  better  coordination  than  is  possible  with  the  administrative
pricing  system  of  the  present  farm price-support  program.
In summary,  collective  bargaining  can  be instituted  to  give farm-
ers  additional  control  over  the  structure  of  farming.  And  it  can  be
instituted  to  stimulate  increased  size or  to  limit  size in  farming.
From  a  strict point  of  view  of welfare  theory,  given  the  charac-
teristics  of  our economy,  it  cannot be  said  whether  increased  collec-
tive  bargaining  would  improve  the  allocation  of resources  or  not.
Collective  bargaining  can  create  wealth  for  farmers  from  four
sources:  (1)  capturing  excess  profits  of  processing  and  distribu-
tion  firms,  (2)  forcing  elimination  of  waste  in  parts  of  the  system,
(3)  contributing  marketing  services,  and  (4)  extracting  monopoly
profits  indirectly  from  consumers.  Only  the  last  source  offers  much
hope  of great  riches.  The  wealth  resulting  from  collective  bargaining
as  well  as  the  distribution  of such  wealth  will  depend upon  the insti-
tution of the rules of collective  bargaining.  The  distribution  of wealth
will likely  be very  uneven.  It will  not  offer  a long-run solution  to the
low-income  problem  in  agriculture.  And  if  the policy  goal  is  a  trans-
fer of  income  to  poor people  in  agriculture,  there  are  more  effective
means of  achieving  that particular  goal. A  highly  graduated  negative
income  tax  is  an  example.
CONCLUSION
If  this  discussion  has  created  the  impression  that:
120The  rules  and  practices  of  collective  bargaining  govern  the out-
come  and  no easy  generalizations  can  be  made;
The  potential  consequences  of collective  bargaining  are  extensive
and  difficult  to  predict;
Collective  bargaining  offers  neither  salvation  nor  damnation  for
farmers;
Collective  bargaining  may  not  result  in  a  less  desirable  alloca-
tion  of resources;
Farmers  can  use  collective  bargaining  to  increase  their  wealth;
Collective  bargaining  is  not  the  solution  to  the  low-income  prob-
lem in farming;
Collective  bargaining  has advantages  over both existing programs
and  atomistic  competition-if  properly  instituted;
Other  policies  may  be  more  effective  in  achieving  some  of  the
goals  sought  by  farmers  through  collective  bargaining;
Collective  bargaining  has  some  real  potential  danger  in  facilitat-
ing  the  concentration  of  power,  but  if  properly  instituted,  effective
discipline  can  be  imposed  by  competitive  processes;
The  policy  issues  are  important  in that  nothing  less  than the  or-
ganization  and  control  of the  economy  is  at stake;
Then  you  got the  message.
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